Offshoring in the New Global Political Economy

abstract    This essay challenges claims by economists and management scholars that 'offshoring' is simply another form of trade with mutual benefits. I argue that reducing wages through offshoring leads to wealth creation for shareholders but not necessarily for countries and employees, and that many displaced workers have difficulty 'trading up' to higher skilled jobs. Offshoring is a new phenomenon that entails the organizational and technological ability to relocate specific tasks and coordinate a geographically dispersed network of activities. It decouples the linkages between economic value creation and geographic location. The result is the creation of global commodity markets for particular skills and a shift in the balance of market power among firms, workers, and countries.     

The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries*

In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfare weights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years. This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to social projects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such as the EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and the social discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury's preferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper, based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, on average, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approach to the estimation of e has previously been under‐utilised by researchers.     

Pathways to Success in M&A

For many if not most publicly traded companies, acquisition capabilities remain a critical component of sustainable longterm growth and profitability. And even as investors press companies to return excess capital through dividends and stock buybacks, the market continues to assign premium valuations to companies that earn above-average returns through a combination of internal investment and judicious acquisition spending.
This article begins by describing major challenges facing acquirers in the current business and regulatory environment. Then, after showing how M&A can be used to address strategic goals, the authors identify key elements in the M&A strategies of three highly successful companies: General Electric, Danaher, and Illinois Tool Works.     

Why are there glitches in product development?

Managers and scholars emphasize the importance of inter‐departmental integration to successful product development and emphasize the importance of product development capabilities to firm performance. Interdepartmental integration can increase shared knowledge; this in turn can reduce the severity and incidence of seemingly unnecessary and costly mistakes leading to more efficient and effective product development. This paper examines the sources of shared knowledge problems across functional and product‐based groups. Using interviews, product development plans, and time‐sheet data, we look at the underlying factors behind two sources of knowledge sharing problems: (1) a serial product development process (i.e. little or no face‐to‐face communications) and (2) ineffective use of integrating mechanisms because of sticky knowledge. For each problem source, we find two key causal factors. We discuss the problems, their factors, and the implications for management and theory.     

An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness

This paper examines the effect of memory loss on the continuity of behavior. We consider a player (individual or firm) who remembers previous actions but not underlying rationales. In a stable environment, relative to a full-recall scenario, memory loss increases the probability of following old policies (inertia). In a volatile environment, memory loss can decrease this probability (impulsiveness). The model provides a memory-loss explanation for some documented psychological biases, implies that inertia and organizational routines should be more important in stable environments than in volatile ones, and provides empirical implications relating memory and environmental variables to economic decisions.     

All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeoversand the source of their advantage. We show how the presenceof arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, sincearbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageurhas the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares.In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares andthe price they pay are determined endogenously. We also presentseveral empirical implications, including the relationship amongtrading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, andthe number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particulardeal.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.